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In a number of European countries microfinance evolved from informal beginnings during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a type of banking of the poor, juxtaposed to the 
commercial and private banking sector. Almost from the onset, microfinance meant financial 
intermediation between microsavings and microcredit, and was powered by intermediation. 
Legal recognition, regulation and mandatory supervision evolved in due course and led to a 
process of mainstreaming during the twentieth century when microfinance became part of 
the formal banking sector. In Germany, the former microfinance institutions now account for 
around 50% of banking assets; outreach is to around 90% of the population. 
 
Microfinance in Asia presumably has a much longer history, though little seems to be known 
about the early history of the hui in China, the chit funds in India, the arisan in Indonesia or 
the paluwagan in the Philippines, to name but a few. Financial institutions of indigenous 
origin, most of them informal, are still exceedingly widespread but have been largely ignored 
in financial sector development. There are exceptions on a limited scale, as in India where 
chit funds are regulated and in Indonesia with its highly diversified rural and microfinance 
sector where various forms of informal financial institutions have been registered and 
eventually regulated throughout the twentieth century. Not a single country has made 
indigenous forms of microfinance a pillar of its modern financial system.  
 
As neither commercial nor development banks nor state-dominated but unsupervised 
cooperatives delivered to the rural and urban masses, credit NGOs, during the 1970s, 
ushered in what came to be known as the microcredit revolution. Powered by donor support 
and international publicity, Grameen Banking became the new model of microcredit, its 
founder the prophet of the microcredit movement. The term microfinance, originally meant to 
comprise financial intermediation between savers and borrowers, was created only in 1990. 
In the mid-1990s it was taken up by CGAP, the donor Consultancy Group to Assist the Poor, 
which has turned the microcredit revolution into the microfinance revolution and 
professionalized microfinance. To some extent it has reinvented history not only in Europe 
but also in Asia and elsewhere where micro- or informal finance and indigenous banking 
have always been based on principles of self-reliance, viability and sustainability. CGAP re-
discovered the principles, but not the indigenous financial sector, be it informal or formal. Has 
the time come to revisit indigenous finance in Asia and re-examine its potential for upgrading, 
mainstreaming and innovating (Seibel 1997, 2001)? India may serve as an example: far 
older and more complex, yet also far less conclusive, than the European experience. 
 
 1.  Is microfinance a new solution for poor people in newly developing countries? 
 
Microfinance
1 is not a recent development, and neither are regulation and supervision of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). Every now developed country and some developing 
countries, particularly in Asia, have a long history of microfinance. It is important to recognize 
this because it presents a view different from that of many in the microfinance community 
who associate microfinance with credit NGOs and believe that microfinance was invented in 
Bangladesh some thirty years ago. We first take a look at the microfinance history of two 
European countries, Ireland and Germany. There are good reasons for that: (i) Attributing the 
origin of microfinance to recent initiatives misses the historical depth and scale of 
microfinance. As a consequence, centuries of experience, of learning from trial and error, 
failure and success in the past are being missed. (ii) Conducive policies in several European 
countries have created an environment in which small microfinance beginnings have evolved 
into vast networks of local financial institutions which are now part of the formal banking 
system. (iii) This may present a vision to those who may think that microfinance is a poor 
solution for poor countries to be replaced by large commercial banks once development 
takes off. (iv) Informal finance and self-help have been at the origin of microfinance in 
Europe. Realizing how informal finance evolved into a major part of the banking system and 
contributed to poverty alleviation and development may induce policymakers, donors and 
researchers to take a fresh look at indigenous and informal finance in the developing world. 
We then take a look at the long and complex and sometimes warped history of microfinance 
and banking in India. 
 
 
2.  Microfinance in Europe: Ireland and Germany 
 
The birth of microfinance in Europe dates back to tremendous increases in poverty since the 
16
th and 17
th century. In response, microfinance in a number of European countries evolved 
from informal beginnings as a type of banking with the poor, juxtaposed to the commercial 
and private banking sector. Almost from the onset, microfinance meant financial 
intermediation between microsavings and microcredit, and was powered by that 
intermediation. Legal recognition, prudential regulation and mandatory supervision evolved in 
due course and led to a process of mainstreaming during the twentieth century when 
microfinance became part of the formal banking sector. However, in one case, that of 
Ireland, regulation has also been used, upon the initiative of commercial banks, to curtail the 
further growth of microfinance. 
                                                  
1 A note on terminology: When I first coined the term microfinance in 1990, I defined it as as a sphere 
of finance comprising microcredit, microsavings and other microfinancial services. I also have used it 
as a synonym for financial intermediation between microsavers and microborrowers or microinvestors. 
In the IFAD Rural Finance Policy (2000) I have defined microfinance as that part of the financial sector 
which comprises formal and informal financial institutions, small and large, that provide small-size 
financial services to the poorer sections of the population as well as larger-size financial services to 
agro-processing and other small and medium rural enterprises. It covers a wide array of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), ranging from indigenous rotating savings and credit associations (RoSCAs) and 
financial cooperatives to rural banks and agricultural development banks. Only a small number of MFIs 
have the status of a non-governmental organization (NGO) or have the support of donors. For 
pragmatic reasons I have always left out moneylenders. However, if we define microfinance as the 
provision of financial services to the lower segements of the population, the poor or the unbanked, 
moneylenders would have to be included. If the economy grows over extended periods of time, and 
with it the household economies and incomes of the lower segments of the population as an integral 
part of the economy as well as the microfinance institutions – do we still call them micro-finance 
institutions? At the workshop we need to agree on a working definition.  
 12.1   The case of Ireland  
 
The early history of microfinance in Ireland covers the period 1720 to 1950; it is unrelated to 
recent initiatives to introduced credit unions. It is the story of how self-help led to a financial 
innovation, legal backing and conducive regulation created a mass microfinance movement, 
and adverse regulation instigated by commercial banking interests brought it down. The so-
called Irish loan funds emerged in the 1720s as charities, initially financed from donated 
resources and providing interest-free loans, but soon replaced by financial intermediation 
between savers and borrowers. Loans were short-term and instalments weekly. Peer 
monitoring was used to enforce repayment. After a century of slow growth, a boom was 
initiated by two events: (a) a special law in 1823, which legalized financial intermediation by 
allowing the funds to collect interest-bearing deposits and to charge interest on loans; and (b) 
the establishment in1836 of a Loan Fund Board for their regulation and supervision. By 1840, 
around 300 funds had emerged as self-reliant and sustainable institutions, generating their 
own resources through deposit collection and providing small loans to the poor. Financing 
their expansion from profits and deposits, their outreach eventually covered 20% of 
households in Ireland. The funds went aggressively after deposit mobilization, offering three 
times higher deposit rates than the commercial banks, charging of course at the same time 
higher interest rates on loans. The threat of competition brought the commercial bankers 
onto the barricades. They used their clout to stop the growth of the Loan Funds: through 
what we would now call financial repression. In1843 the commercial banks induced the 
government to put a cap on interest rates. The Loan Funds lost thus their competitive 
advantage, which caused their gradual decline during the second half of the 19
th century, 
until they finally disappeared in the 1950s. The history of the Irish Loan Funds thus 
comprises three phases: a century of gradual growth as informal institutions; a few decades 
of rapid expansion as formal institutions in a conducive regulatory environment; and a 
century of decline due to financial repression.  
 
2.2  The case of Germany  
The story of microfinance in Germany, covering more than two centuries, is one of self-help, 
regulation and supervision, which have created, relative to its population, the largest 
microfinance sector of any country. It comprises two networks: community savings funds, 
now referred to as savings banks in English
2, and member-owned cooperative associations, 
now referred to as cooperative banks.  
 
The community-owned financial institutions started during the latter part of the 18th century. 
Having learned from the early Irish charities (a) that charity is not sustainable and (b) that 
there is a strong demand among the poorer sections of the population to for safe deposit 
facilities, the first thrift society was established in Hamburg in 1778, followed by the first 
communal savings fund (Sparkasse) in 1801. As the movement spread, the influx of savings 
forced the savings funds to expand their credit business, including agricultural lending. The 
Prussian state responded with regulation, passing the first Prussian Savings Banks Decree 
in 1838 – fifteen years after the Irish government had passed a law on loan funds. In 1884 
the savings banks formed the German savings banks association. 
 
The second microfinance movement started after the hunger year of 1846/47. Starvation was 
widespread; many peasants lost their fields to the moneylenders, and many small 
businesses went bankrupt. Two men are prominent among those who took action: Raiffeisen 
in rural areas, creating credit associations (Darlehnskassen-Vereine) predominantly of 
farmers, later known as Raiffeisenkassen and now Raiffeisenbanken; and Schulze-Delitzsch 
in urban areas, establishing savings and credit cooperatives among craftsmen and other 
small entrepreneurs, now called Volksbanken (people’s banks). In 1847, with the help of 
contributions by some wealthy people, Raiffeisen established a rural charity association in 
Weyerbusch, bringing in grain from non-affected areas in the East. Within a few months, this 
                                                  
2 In German they have retained their original name: Sparkasse. 
 2brought down the price of bread by 50 %. His initiative was paralleled in 1850 by Schulze-
Delitzsch’s first urban credit association, who insisted on self-help without charity from the 
beginning. Raiffeisen soon realized that charity did not lead to sustainable institutions. In 
1864 he established the first rural credit association in Heddesdorf, following Schulze-
Delitzsch’s example who rejected charity. During the next twenty years, the initiative 
gradually turned into a movement, but growth was slow, reaching not more than 245 rural 
cooperatives in the mid-1880s. The turn-around came in 1889, when both the rural and the 
urban networks of credit associations were brought under the law: the Cooperative Act of the 
German Reich, the first cooperative law in the world. At the same time, joint liability, which 
had kept back the growth of the system, was replaced by limited liability. Until 1914, the 
number of rural cooperatives in Germany increased to more than 15,000 and spread to many 
other countries around the world.
3 In 1934 all financial institutions were brought under the 
banking law. But both networks kept their identity, adding their respective legal provisions to 
those of the general banking law. Historically there have been three stages: informal 
beginnings with slow growth; regulation of MFIs as special financial institutions which led not 
only to rapid growth of outreach but also to worldwide institutional dissemination; and 
consolidation under the banking law, which turned them into universal banks.  
 
Until recently, there has been a sharp distinction between rural and urban MFIs: Cooperative 
banks comprised Raiffeisenbanken which were rural and Volksbanken which were urban; 
savings banks comprised Kreissparkassen which were rural and Stadtsparkassen which 
were urban. In recent years a process of amalgamation has set in within the networks, but 
only at the local level. The two types of institutions have spread throughout Europe and 
beyond, but are more prominent in continental Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon part. The 
spectacular success of microfinance in Germany, which pushed moneylenders out of 
business, is due to several factors:  
 
  self-help and self-reliance based on the dynamic growth of savings  
  local outreach with lasting house-banking relationships 
  the evolution of a legal framework: 1838 first savings funds decree; 1889 first 
Cooperative Act
4; 1934 expansion of the banking law to savings funds (or savings 
banks) and cooperative banks 
  establishment of regional and national apex organizations of savings funds and 
cooperatives during the 1870s and 1880s
5 
  delegated supervision through auditing federations of the national and regional apex 
organizations evolving in several stages.
6    
 
This has resulted in a financial system in Germany which is dominated by these former 
microfinance institutions. In 1997 the two microfinance networks comprised 39,000 branches, 
                                                  
3 In 1866, Raiffeisen published his first cooperative handbook (Die Darlehnskassen-Vereine), which 
went through several revised editions until 1887, reflecting the trials and errors of the movement.  It 
has lost little of its actuality and could teach many a microfinance expert a lesson, eg, when and when 
not to use joint and several liability as a collateral substitute; and how to avoid moral hazard in setting 
up cattle insurance. 
 
4 The law also abolished joint and several liability of cooperative members, which had kept back the 
expansion of the movement, in favor of limited liability. 
5 A Savings Banks Association (DSV) was established in 1884, followed by DSGV in 1924. The rural 
and urban cooperatives had separate associations, united into the DGRV only in 1971. 
6 These evolved in several stages: (1) 1860s-80s voluntary auditing, emergence of auditing 
federations; financial difficulties during the 1880s due to inadequacies in auditing. (2) In the case of 
cooperatives mandatory auditing as part of the new cooperative law in 1889, but optionally either by 
auditing federations or freelance auditors. This again resulted in financial difficulties under freelance 
auditors during the 1920s. (3) 1934 mandatory auditing by separate auditing federations for all 
banking networks including savings and cooperative banks; the auditing federations were in turn 
supervised by the financial authorities. (4) Today DGRV and DSGV serve as supervisory apexes, 
comprising a national auditing federation as well as regional and specialized auditing federations.  
 375 million customers, 64% of all financial intermediation and 51.4% of all banking assets. 
Since then, a process of consolidation has set in, reducing the number of branches of the 
two networks to 29,500 as of 2002; this is 93% of all bank branches in Germany. One may 
question the term MFI for these banks; but they have retained their traditional orientation to 
smaller individual clients and small businesses. In 2002 savings and cooperative banks 
accounted for 53% of all retail loans to private individuals and 57% of all loans to small and 
medium enterprises. Compared to the four big commercial banks, small and local is 
profitable. In 2002 pre-tax return on equity was 8.2% among savings banks, 9.2% among 
cooperative banks and –3.1% among the four big commercial banks. No wonder that the 
latter have become envious of microfinance and taken action in Brussels, comparable to the 
intervention of commercial banks in Ireland in 1843, to revoke community guarantees to 
savings banks. 
 
2.3  Lessons to be learned  
 
Three centuries of microfinance in Europe have taught a number of lessons that financial 
systems developers should be aware of, including the following: Informal local initiatives 
based on self-help have a tremendous potential. Their foundation are savings, provided by 
depositors or shareholders. Savings are the essence of self-help and self-reliance, both of 
the household or small enterprise and of local financial organizations. The viability and 
sustainability of small enterprises (farm or non-farm) and of local financial institutions are 
intertwined: they fall or grow together. Continual access to financial services, particularly 
savings and credit, over long periods of time are crucial in poverty alleviation and economic 
development, which are both interrelated; there is no sustainable poverty alleviation without 
economic development. Local financial institutions, some of them very small, have proven 
their ability of providing such services for generation after generation.
7 Of crucial importance 
in the evolution of local financial institutions have been two factors: 
 
•  The first is regulation through an appropriate legal framework, with changes and 
amendments over time.  
•  The second is effective supervision, delegated because of their large number to apex 




Beyond this, we have to be careful with generalizations: different European countries have 
taken different paths in microfinance. Eg, while Germany and countries like Italy have stuck 
to a multitude of local financial institutions, the Netherlands have created a central 
cooperative banking institution, Rabobank; France has its Crédit Agricole; and Sweden has 
merged its savings and cooperative banks into a single national banking institution. One may 
hypothesize that Germany is a federation and therefore tends to institutional diversity; but 
Italy shows a similarly diversified structure of local financial institutions and is not a 
federation. There just is no single best practice model. 
 
Presenting experience from Europe is not meant as a proposal to replicate European 
models. Unfortunately, mechanical replication around the world of models which are 
successful in one country is bound to failure as the experience of Grameen banking in many 
countries outside of Bangladesh has shown. Similarly, the replication of Raiffeisen banking 
has failed in many developing countries when usurped and perverted by the state. Just as 
                                                  
7 Take the Raiffeisenkasse Urmitz as an example, about 100 years old and since 1934 a cooperative 
bank. When the author grew up in Urmitz, the village had 1700 inhabitants. Since its inception, the 
Raiffeisenkasse has been viable and sustainable, with just a few hundred customers. Only recently, 
under pressures to offer more than basic services, has it been amalgamated with the Raiffeisenkassen 
of seven neighboring villages and turned into a branch. CGAP claims that it takes at least 3000 
customers for an MFI to be viable. Historically, this has not been the experience of Germany. 
8 Bundesbank and since 1962 Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen, replaced in 2002 by 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin). 
 4science proceeds not by verification but falsification of theories and their underlying 
hypotheses as Popper (1959) has shown, there may be more to be learned from errors than 
faithful adherence to doctrine. The history of errors in European microfinance is yet to be 
written, but two may be mentioned here, the first perhaps of interest to policymakers in 
francophone Africa and believers in appropriate interest rates, the other to Grameen bankers 
and other proponents of group lending: (1) Interest ceilings imposed in Ireland in 1843 
undermined the competitiveness of the Irish Funds and eventually led to their extinction. (2) 
Joint and several liability were an effective collateral substitute and risk management tool in 
early credit associations in Germany, but proved an impediment to the further growth of loan 
sizes and the spread of institutions until abolished by the Cooperative Act of 1889.  
 
 53.   Microfinance in India 
 
3.1  Origins and early developments
9 
 
The case of India shows that the origins of microfinance predate those reported above in 
Ireland and Germany by more than two and perhaps even three millenniums. There are at 
least three strands of indigenous finance of great historical depth in India: moneylenders, chit 
funds or rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), and merchant bankers – each 
with a complex and interlinked history, much of it yet to be written. To draw lessons from this 
experience would require systematic historical research from a microfinance perspective. 
The following may serve as an inducement to embark on such research and share the 
results with the microfinance community. This is all the more important as India, over a 
period of three thousand years, has spread its culture, trade and banking through vast parts 
of south and south-east Asia and may continue to do so as far as its latest rural finance 
innovation is concerned: SHG banking.  
 
Moneylenders who provide loans from their own resources as their only financial service are 
the oldest of these professions, dating back to prehistoric times. There was probably a long 
period of transition from gift-exchange, reciprocal lending and trading-cum-lending to 
specialized lending, and from lending-in-kind to lending-in-money before the first millennium 
B.C. Moneylending became an organized and subsequently regulated profession in India 
around 1700-2200 years ago as shown below. Information on rural moneylending in 
medieval and British India will be given below. Moneylending is still widespread today, and 
remnants of its historical informal precedents are still in existence, re-emerging time and 
again according to demand. Many (informal and formal) moneylenders may have turned into 
(formal) merchant bankers at various times in history, or into organizers of (informal or 
formal) chit funds; this is a subject on which I have no information.  
 
Chit funds
10 or ROSCAs are widespread institutions of ancient origin in India
11; but I have 
not been able to determine the time of origin. A number of people, usually under an 
organizer, join together to regularly (eg, daily, weekly, monthly) contribute equal amounts of 
money (or kind) allocated to one member at a time; a cycle ends when each participant had 
his turn. It appears that historically they were relatively small and unregulated. There are two 
types: the conventional type, found all over the world, in which the full amount contributed 
(apart from minor deductions) is allocated to one member at a time, either by lot, 
demonstrated need or in an agreed-upon sequence; and an advanced type found in a 
number of Asian countries including China, Vietnam and Nepal where the amount collected 
is allocated by auction to the lowest bidder and the balance returned to the members, or by 
tender. In response to increasing business opportunities, the bidding type has been gradually 
replacing the conventional type, but I do not know over which period of time. As chit funds 
grew in size and volume and the risk of fraudulent pyramid schemes increased, there has 
been a tendency of regulating the chits. Starting with the Travancore Chit Act of 1945 
followed by other state-level laws, they were increasingly included in the formal financial 
sector. Chit funds attained such importance that in 1982, after ten years of deliberations, a 
federal Chit Funds Act was passed, providing legal status to chits as non-banking financial 
intermediaries. The act regulates minimum capital, ceilings on aggregate chit amounts, 
procedures of dispute settlement, etc. This has greatly contributed to the growth of licensed 
chit funds, which are found all over India in large numbers.  
 
Merchant banking – ie, financial intermediation comprising lending, deposit taking and other 
financial services – evolved in India during the first millennium B.C. and was widespread in 
                                                  
9 Chapter 3.1 and and part of 3.2 have greatly benefited from Schrader 1997. 
10 Known under various names such as chitty or kuri (cowry). 
11 The alternative term kuri indicates that it must have existed at least at medieval times when cowries 
were used as a means of exchange. 
 6India and beyond as early as the third century B.C. Merchant guilds, which dealt in goods 
and money, appeared already in the Vedic scripts, the oldest parts of which date back 
beyond the first millennium B.C. Between 200 B.C. and 300 A.D. a differentiation took place 
between the guild of moneylenders and the guild of traders, followed by the emergence of a 
guild of merchant bankers. The guilds eventually turned into strictly hereditary castes, and 
banking became a sub-caste of the traders’ caste (vaisya).
12 Regulation evolved during the 
first two centuries A.D. when a law code, dharmashastras, was written regulating loan deeds, 
law courts and debt procedures in detail. Moneylending and banking became licensed and 
tax-paying professions.
13 Usury initially was a major issue of religious disputation. This was 
eventually resolved by agreements over “reasonable” interest rates, eg, 15% p.a. on secured 
loans and higher rates on unsecured loans. The latter ranged from 2% p.m. on loans to a 
priest (Brahman) to 5% p.m. to a cultivator (shudra), supposedly reflecting different 
assessments of risk by caste
14 Interest payments could also be made in kind, but at a 
substantially higher rate. Unrecovered loans were written off after 10 years. In addition there 
was social banking, ie, interest-free loans to the deserving and the poor. (Bhargava 1934; 
Schrader 1997:71-83) 
 
Medieval India, the period from the mid-thirteenth century to the beginning of British rule 
during the eighteenth century, with its highly monetized economy was the heyday of 
indigenous banking. With domestic and international long-distance trade, merchant banking 
grew enormously, held by individual firms, joint family firms and partnership firms – all within 
the same baniya caste, but differentiated into numerous sub-castes. Their customers 
included European private merchants and trading companies. They also advanced working 
capital to weavers and other artisans to produce goods on order for Indian or European 
merchants – an Indian (monetized!) version of the putting-out system. Some secured 
commercial interest rates during the 17
th century were reported between 0.5 and 1.25% p.m.; 
risky commercial credit fetched a flat rate of 40-60% per trade venture. The basic principle of 
merchant banking were mutual trust and mutual benefit: very much in contrast to what 
emerged at the same time in rural finance. 
 
Rural finance, mostly in the form of abusive moneylending, spread under the Delhi sultanate 
with the introduction of a system of land revenue, housing tax and cattle tax to be paid in 
cash. Land was abundant; but the payment of taxes in cash was difficult, forcing the 
peasants to produce for the market. This resulted in the overall commercialization and 
monetization of the rural economy and the expansion of trade. At the same time it created a 
new market for the financial professions: rural moneylenders advanced land revenue 
payments to the peasantry; merchant bankers financed trade. Indigenous banking in Mughal 
India, ie, during the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, is described in detail 
by Schrader 1997. The urban population paid a mere 5% of their income in taxes, while land 
assessments in rural areas varied from one third to one half of the produce. Assessments of 
actual production were soon replaced by average pre-assessments, which caused severe 
hardship during bad years. This created a large class of rent-seekers, comprising tax 
collectors, moneylenders and a ruling class of landlords and officials without a salary but with 
rights to collect revenues; they kept about one quarter and transferred between one quarter 
and one third of the revenue to the government. Moneylending became part of everyday life 
                                                  
12 Financial services provided by the merchant bankers included lending, deposit-taking, discounting 
bills and promissory notes, providing guarantees, issuing drafts, letters of credit and circular notes, 
hundi (written drafts), money-changing and safekeeping of valuables. Some top bankers also provided 
state financial functions: treasury, minting, revenue collection, and the financing of wars. 
13 It appears that moneylending and banking were not monopolized by the respective castes, as Hindu 
temples and Buddhist monasteries were frequently involved in financial services as a means of self-
financing.  
14 These figures are based on the Manu, one of the ancient texts of the time. The older Kautalya 
reports interest rates of 5% p.m. on ordinary monetary loans irrespective of caste and rates of 10% 
and 20% p.m. on loans to high-risk borrowers such as sea-faring merchants and forest explorers, 
respectively. The regulation thus led to a substantial lowering of interest rates. 
 7in Indian villages. As rural indebtedness and the loss of land to moneylenders surged, 
microfinance turned into usurious moneylending of the worst kind. Peasants became serfs; 
they could not be displaced as long as the revenue was paid, but, if not, were punished by 
expropriation, bonded labor, enslavement and even death for what was considered an act of 
rebellion against the government. This led to a land revolution-in-reverse: dispossessing the 
peasants and converting their rights of occupancy into rights of tax collection (zamindari): 
inheritable, alienable and mortgageable.  
 
In British India microfinance and banking changed substantially, starting in 1757 (Battle of 
Plassey). The imposition of trade restrictions and the exclusion of Indian merchants from 
long-distance maritime trade led led to a decline of indigenous trading and merchant 
banking. Interventionist policies such as the preferential importation of cloth from England 
dealt a death-blow to Indian textile manufacturing and the ancient commercial structure. 
However, this was followed by a rise in domestic trade and a shift to Bombay as the main 
centre of indigenous industry and banking. European finance limited itself largely to 
European enterprise. In rural areas, new legislation on land revenue collection, private 
property and land mortgaging and the transformation of subsistence agriculture into cash-
crop production created new opportunities for moneylender, who could now enforce their 
claims in court. During the first half of the 20
th century, rural indebtedness first increased, 
then was reigned in by moneylender, usury and tenancy legislation, but finally led to the rise 
of new types of lenders with an interest in acquiring the land of their borrowers. 
Cooperatives, introduced top-down, At the same time, the bankers’ castes rose to new 
heights. In the sphere of big business they adopted Western banking by pooling their capital, 
establishing joint-stock companies or buying shares of banks; in the small and medium 
business sphere indigenous-style banking continued.  
 
3.2  Independent India: searching for new approaches to reach the rural poor 
 
Upon independence India faced an underdeveloped rural economy, high levels of 
indebtedness and a lack of efficient financial services. Since the 1950s the lack of rural 
development has been attributed to a lack of access to credit to finance production assets. 
Private banks that should have provided such credit were absent from rural areas; and 
informal finance, through moneylenders, friends, relatives and rotating chit funds, was 
inadequate. 80% of the population lived in rural areas; 40% of GDP was contributed by 
agriculture; but only 2.2% of total credit went to agriculture – almost exclusively to medium 
and big farmers. No attempts were made to build on indigenous informal finance, despite the 
fact that, according to Reserve Bank of India findings, informal credit accounted in 1951 for 
90% and in 1971 for 70% of rural indebtedness; there was no mentioning of savings. Instead, 
to remedy the situation, the Union Government took three related measures in 1969: the 
nationalization of 14 private banks (followed by another six in 1980); the requirement to open 
two rural branches for every urban branch; and a mandatory system of priority sector 
lending.  
 
A stocktaking in 1975 revealed that as a result of the institutional expansion policy, 10,882 
rural and semi-urban branches had been opened; yet the poor still lacked access to credit. It 
was concluded that rural branches of large commercial banks, be they private or public, are 
thus not the right answer. Hence, the government introduced a new network of government-
owned Regional Rural Banks (RRBs), regulated and supervised banking institutions with a 
low capital base of around $250,000, each covering with its branches a designated service 
area of 1-3 districts. By 2005 there were 196 RRBs with a rural branch network of 14,000, 
including 12,084 rural and 1,875 semi-urban branches. Yet the problem persisted: RRBs and 
cooperative banks catered for farmers, not the vast numbers of landless, migrant laborers 
and illiterate women.  
 
In 1981 RBI carried out the All-India Debt and Investment Survey, published in 1983. After 
years of massive branch expansion, policies of directing credit to the rural areas, massive 
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billion from the World Bank with the requirement that at least 60% went to small farmers –, a 
total of 14 million small loans had been provided by banks, yet some 250 million of the rural 
poor had no access to formal finance, and 39% of rural indebtedness stemmed from informal 
sources (though a huge reduction compared to 1951 and 1971!).  
 
In 1982 RBI transformed its agricultural credit department into a new apex bank: the National 
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), with responsibility eventually for 
some 160,000 rural financial outlets, among them around 100,000 credit cooperatives 
(PACS). On the basis of the 1981 survey NABARD concluded that, while India had one of 
the most complex rural financial infrastructures of any developing country, that system had 
failed to attain its objective of reaching the rural poor. Among the reasons identified were a 
sole emphasis on production loans, prohibitive transaction costs for lenders and borrowers, 
failure to mobilize savings, and overly complicated procedures.  
 
The contradiction between a highly diversified rural financial infrastructure and lack of access 
of the rural masses to financial services continues to plague India; this is paralleled by 
another contradiction: between an emphasis on institutional diversity and a lack of emphasis 
on institutional viability. There are 97 commercial banks with 57,772 branches, 32,244 of 
them (56%) located in rural areas. Among them are 27 state banks which hold more than 
80% of commercial banking assets and dominating the banking sector. There are 196 
Regional Rural Banks with 11,944 rural retail outlets. In addition there are 115,000 rural 
cooperative outlets. The total number of rural outlets of the formal sector is thus around 
160,000. Yet, according to a rural finance access survey conducted in 2003, over 70% of 
small farmers and landless have no deposit account; 87% have no access to formal credit. 
The commercial banking sector has been the first to be reformed, followed by the regional 
rural banks which is still ongoing.  
 
Turning from the old to a new world of rural finance during the second half of the 1980s, 
NABARD argued that programs with the poor have to be savings-led and not credit-driven; 
and that the poor have to have a say in their design. In the years to come they looked for 
new partners, new delivery systems and new financial products. One of these new partners 
was MYRADA, one of now 700 credit NGOs and MFIs, whose action research into credit 
management groups during 1985-88 was funded by NABARD jointly with CIDA. The study 
was based on a new paradigm: savings first. Three options were discussed, all hinging on 
prior savings by the groups: matching grants, matching interest-free loans, or loans with 
interest. In search for a sustainable solution, NABARD opted for the latter. (Seibel 2005) 
 
3.3  Cooperative finance: replication gone astray 
 
It is difficult to do justice to the complexities of the Indian financial sector and its changes 
over time. The financial cooperative sector is a major part of rural finance in India which must 
be included here however briefly. It dates back to 1892 when the Government of Madras 
Presidency felt inspired by the German Raiffeisen movement of savings and credit 
cooperatives and recommended, just three years after the passing of the German 
Cooperative Act in 1889, to replicate the approach in India. In 1901 the Government of India 
accepted the proposal and in 1904 enacted the Co-operative Credit Societies Act, followed 
by the more comprehensive Co-operative Societies Act in 1912. This was to serve as a 
framework for promoting self-help among farmers and artisans. Under the Government of 
India Act of 1919, authority over cooperatives was transferred to the provinces, which were 
authorized to enact their own co-operative laws. It is not clear whether state dominance 
evolved from here and how soon self-help and self-reliance were undermined by well-
meaning state interventions.  
 
Following the recommendations of the All India Rural Credit Committee in 1954 and the 
Committee of Co-operative Law in 1955, many states introduced “state partnership” in their 
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laws were encumbered by the ideology of a planned economy, giving the state a dominant 
role in all institutions including cooperatives. Extensive regulatory power is conferred to state 
governments in matters such as appointment of chief executives, suspension of elected 
boards of directors, compulsory fusion or fission of co-operative banks, amendment of 
bylaws, vetoing of bank decisions, issuing of directives, and supervision. The state 
cooperative administration is in charge of registration, licensing, statutory inspections and 
audit of the cooperative banks. The states participate also in the ownership of cooperative 
institutions all levels down to primary societies. Bureaucracy, government intervention and 
loan channelling have replaced self-management and self-reliance.  
 
The cooperative sector with short-term financial services now comprises 98,247 primary 
credit cooperatives with 100 million members; and 368 district cooperative banks with 12,652 
branches, acting as federations of the primaries and providing wholesale and retail finance. 
Long-term finance is provided by 768 primary cooperative agricultural and rural development 
banks with 1,091 district branches and 13 million members; and 20 state banks with 887 
branches. 30 state cooperative banks act as apex banks to the district banks and provide 
both short- and long-term finance. In addition there are 2,015 urban cooperative banks. 
Accounting for 69% of all rural retail outlets, the sector mobilizes 31% of rural savings and 
provides 57% of agricultural and 29% of investment credit. Yet, while outreach is large, 
efficiency is low: loan recovery rates of district cooperative banks and primary societies are 
around 67% and substantially lower among the two providers of long-term credit (46% and 
55%, respectively; the rates of loss-making institutions are 20% among state cooperative 
banks, 30% among district banks,43% among primary societies, and 75% and 55%, 
respectively,  among the two providers of term finance: primary and state cooperative banks. 
Following the reforms of the commercial and regional rural banking sectors, steps are now 
being taken to reform the cooperative financial sector; GTZ is assisting. (Hannover & 
Haberberger 2004)  
 
3.4  Linking formal and non-formal finance: a financial innovation 
 
Yet, reform of the regional rural and cooperative financial sectors is not seen as a solution for 
reaching some 250-300 million rural poor. The trigger in the search for rural financial 
innovations in India to reach the poor was an external event: the APRACA regional workshop 
in Nanjing, China, in May 1986, where GTZ presented a linkage model based on the existing 
formal and nonformal financial infrastructure (Seibel 1985). Elements included SHGs as 
informal financial intermediaries; savings-based credit linkages with banks; informal groups 
holding savings and credit accounts in banks; NGOs (SHPIs) as social, and initially also 
financial, intermediaries; flexible models of cooperation between SHGs, NGOs and banks as 
autonomous business partners, each with its own existing financial and institutional 
resources (APRACA 1986). Several Asian countries took up the challenge. In contrast to 
those countries were a GTZ expert carried out feasibility studies, NABARD coordinated a 
field study of SHGs in 1987 with a team from various Indian institutions. To identify SHGs, 
the team approached NGOs; SHGs without any link to an NGO, including the ubiquitous chit 
funds, were thus not included in the study. Almost all the groups were of recent origin, 
emphasized self-help, were largely homogeneous in terms of caste and activity, built a 
common fund from very small regular savings and interest income, and lent to their members 
for periods of 1-3 months at 2-3% interest per month. Recovery of these loans was excellent, 
and an impact, however small, was felt, reaching from emergency assistance to release from 
bonded labor. While the groups preferred to remain informal, they shared basic features of 
formal bodies in terms of bookkeeping and management. Access to formal credit was 
virtually nonexistent. NGOs reportedly had “played a commendable role in organising the 
rural poor into self-help groups and thereafter promoting their proper functioning.” Given the 
very low resource base of internally generated savings on the one hand and some notable 
exceptions of “effectively developed credit links between the target groups and banks”, the 
team thought it “desirable to consider development of flexible models of linkages appropriate 
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developed for evolving appropriate linkage models” (NABARD 1989: 53-58) 
 
In1988 Bank Indonesia, the central bank, started a Pilot Project Linking Banks and SHGs in 
Indonesia, with technical assistance from GTZ. With increasing participation from banks and 
NGOs, this became APRACA’s and GTZ’s first experimental station for linkage banking in 
Asia. Given an abundance of financial self-help groups in Indonesia, the project limited itself 
to those and made no attempt to establish new groups. The general manager and later 
chairman of NABARD, Y.C. Nanda, visited the project several times, learning that the central 
bank had authorized its public and private banks to accept informal groups as customers and 
lend to them without physical collateral; repayment rates at the time were close to 100%. 
Intensely monitored and reported upon at APRACA meetings and international conventions, 
it attracted widespread attention, among others by the president of the World Bank, who 
declared in the foreword of the World Development Report 1989 (pp. iv; 119): “Informal 
financial institutions have proved able to serve the household, agricultural, and 
microenterprise sectors on a sustained basis. Measures that link informal institutions to the 
formal financial system will improve that service and ensure a competitive environment.” 
APRACA member institutions, including NABARD, felt inspired. 
 
Reviewing the situation of rural finance in India again in 1989, it was observed that most of 
the 196 Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) were loss-making and thus did not present a viable 
solution. This led to a discussion in parliament about the feasibility of a Grameen Bank, 
following the model of Bangladesh, as a new national banking structure. On the basis of its 
own studies and also inspired by the linkage experience under APRACA, NABARD instead 
argued for a different approach with the following distinguishing elements:  
•  using the existing infrastructure of banks and social organizations;  
•  it should be savings- rather than credit-led;  
•  and using bank rather than donor resources in the provision of credit.  
 
Between 1989 and 1991, NABARD (1991) entered into a policy dialogue with RBI to make 
preparations for a pilot project linking informal groups to banks. On 24 July 1991 RBI issued 
a circular to commercial banks (RPCD.No.Plan.BC.13/PL-09-22/90-91) advising them to 
actively participate in the pilot project, refinanced by NABARD, for linking SHGs with banks. 
The groups may be registered or unregistered, have 10-25 members, should have been in 
existence for at least six months, and should have actively promoted the savings habit.  
 
The pilot phase covered the period 1992-96. The banks noted a contradiction between a 
directive of the RBI of 27 December 1985, which restricted the opening of savings accounts, 
and the circulars of RBI and NABARD authorizing bank linkages of informal groups: did the 
SHG banking circulars allow for savings accounts or just credit? This was finally decided in a 
circular (DBOD.No.BC.63/13:01:08/92-93) by RBI on January 4, 1993: “… such Self-Help 
Groups, registered or unregistered, may be allowed to open Savings Bank Accounts with 
banks.” At mid-term, March 1994, 637 SHGs (80% women’s groups) with 11,000 members, 
most of them women, had been credit-linked to 28 banks, comprising 16 commercial and 12 
regional rural banks. 34 NGOs were involved as facilitators. Large numbers of officers of 
NABARD were sent to MYRADA and other NGOs for exposure training. By March 1996, 
4,757 SHGs with 80,000 members had been mobilized by 127 NGOs and credit-linked to 95 
bank branches. During the pilot phase mainly SHGs were linked to banks that had previously 
been established by NGOs. 
 
NABARD evaluated the project and found that the program was highly suitable for poor and 
very poor women particularly in marginal, resource-poor areas; membership has come 
mostly from the poorest section of the society; women frequently need credit, but at irregular 
intervals; they use the loans for productive and non-productive purposes, with a trend 
towards productive investments; incomes have gone up; even the poorest of the poor do 
save, and their savings increase with the income; transaction costs of banks and SHG 
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60% in agricultural credit. In comparison to the Grameen Bank model, NABARD found that 
“the SHG linkage model appears more sustainable and appropriate in the Indian conditions 
where  (India has) in place a vast network of rural bank branches… (and) SHGs which are 
functioning on their own and waiting to be linked to the banking system.” (Nanda 1995)  
 
Nationwide mainstreaming started in 1996 after clarifying two issues by circular: (i) SHG 
members who had earlier defaulted on bank loans and were therefore not bankable could 
obtain loans from the groups’ own internal funds if so decided; (ii) informal groups were 
limited to 20 members, beyond which they would be required to legally register. To 
implement mainstreaming, NABARD did the following: (i) it provided refinancing to 
participating banks; (ii) it declared SHG banking the dominant, but non-mandatory approach 
of lending to the poor, replacing bank retail lending; (iii) it propagated its grand vision of one 
million SHGs, representing a population of 100 million of the rural poor, to be credit-linked by 
the year 2008 endorsed by NABARD’s regional directors and subsequently articulated by 
union government in all its budget speeches; (iv) it created a Micro Credit Innovations 
Department (MCID) as the program steering unit, with representations in all states through 
Micro Credit Innovations Cells; (v) it set up a special fund to finance massive capacity-
building measures
15 as the motor of expansion; (vi) it supported the establishment and 
maintenance of SHGs through numerous NGOs and GOs; and (vii) it subsequently allowed 
for initiatives to organize SHGs in self-sustained federations (Nair 2005) under a new legal 
form as Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies (MACS).  
 
Backed by the joint political will of the Union Government, state governments, the Reserve 
Bank of India and NABARD, program dissemination and capacity building expanded rapidly 
in the following years. The number of SHGs credit-linked to banks grew to 33,000 in 1999 
and 115,000 in 2000. By the turn of the year 2003/04 it had reached the goal of one million 
credit-linked SHGs: now the largest and fastest-growing microfinance program in the 
developing world. As of March 2005 it has reached 1.6 million savings-based groups credit-
linked to 35,294 bank branches and primary cooperatives, with 23.96 million members 
covering a population of over 120 million people predominantly from the lowest social strata. 
The majority of members (90%) are women: by choice, not program design. As transaction 
costs are low and repayment rates near 100%, SHG banking is highly profitable to the banks, 
despite lending rates, which are deregulated, from banks to SHGs between 10% and 13% 
(Seibel & Dave 2002). At very low transaction costs to the SHGs and onlending rates to 
members around 24% (higher among new and lower among older groups), internal 
resources grow rapidly, increasing the financial self-reliance of the groups (Karduck & Seibel 
2004). Growth continues, performance is excellent, and impact is deeply felt by the 
members: on employment, income, self-confidence, children’s education and, last but not 
least, moneylenders; they have largely gone out of business in the areas of operation of 
SHGs. Challenges remain, particularly in terms of further expansion into underserved areas, 
effective supervision, institutional sustainability of informal groups, and the role of SHG 
federations. Yet, there are good prospects that SHG banking will continue to grow in 
outreach and financial depth.  
 
                                                  
15 Available on NABARD’s website: http://www.NABARD.org/roles/microfinance/  
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3.   Summary and conclusions 
 
The history of microfinance in Europe tells us that local financial institutions may evolve from 
very small informal beginnings through a stage of semiformal finance, in which networking 
and self-regulation are instrumental, to mainstreaming as a major part of the banking sector 
is feasible. In some European countries the microfinance institutions-turned-banks are in the 
thousands, some of them very small and yet sustainable. in others they been centralized in 
single national institutions. Also, ownership may be public, in this case by communities, or 
cooperative. There does not seem to be a single best practice model. After an initial period of 
trial and error, charity as a source of funds and joint and several liability as a collateral 
substitute were found to be bad practices and abandoned. Invariably savings have served as 
the foundation of self-reliance and the motor of growth. In the case of Germany crucial inputs 
into the historical process of mainstreaming have been the provision early-on of a conducive 
legal framework, appropriate regulation, and effective delegated supervision through auditing 
federations of the microfinance networks. In the case of Ireland, inappropriate regulation in 
the form of interest ceilings have led to the withering-away of the oldest microfinance network 
in Europe. On the whole the history of microfinance in the various European countries is 
spotty and requires further research. This would provide a basis for a discussion of elements 
of the European experience which may be replicable and included among lessons learned. 
 
In most developing countries the history of microfinance is yet to be written. In many it will be 
difficult to do so for want of written documents. This makes it difficult to build on the existing, 
mostly informal, foundations of microfinance and learn from past experience. Eg, Nigeria is 
the only African country south of the Sahara of which I know that microfinance existed at 
least as early as 500 years ago, namely in the form of rotating savings and credit 
associations. They are called esusu among the Yoruba in Nigeria, now a lingua franca term 
in many West African countries. As a form of social capital, the esusu was transported during 
the slave trade to the Caribbean islands, where both the institution and the term still exist 
today; they are now being carried to major American cities by a new wave of migrants who 
are unbankable in their new environment. Their origin were probably rotating work groups, in 
which labor as a scarce commodity was accumulated and allocated to one member at a time; 
and then, with the spreading of commercial transactions, replaced by money, such as 
cowries, manilas, pounds and Naira. Nigeria is one of the countries where informal financial 
institutions are pervasive, and still the most important form of microfinance, albeit informal. 
Ignorance or poor judgment has taken its toll on Nigeria: In 1934 C.F. Strickland, a British 
cooperative expert, examined the esusu as a possible basis for modern cooperative societies 
in Western Nigeria. Having previously worked in India where he encountered the rotating chit 
funds, he speculated that the esusu must have been imported from India, which he 
considered a superior culture, at some unknown time and concluded that in this case one 
might as well import cooperatives from England instead of modernizing the esusu (Strickland 
1934). The consequences of his judgment were far-reaching: the Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance, introduced in 1935 and modelled after British-Indian cooperatives, became the 
blueprint for the British colonies in Africa. It was only in Eastern Nigeria where financial 
cooperatives flourished: encouraged by enlightened cooperative officers to build on the 
ubiquitous isusu, the Igbo version of the esusu. Had a legal and supervisory framework been 
provided for the esusu, isusu, adashi, bam and whatever ROSCAs are called in the 350 
ethnic groups, and had their origin not been misjudged, would Nigeria have needed 
cooperatives, community banks, MFIs and an agricultural development bank – all struggling 
along? (Seibel & Damachi 1982; Seibel 1984) 
 
India is a country, or subcontinent, where microfinance and banking have evolved over more 
than 3000 years and spread through trading relations over the wider region. We may know 
little about the dissemination process, but perhaps far more about India itself than any other 
country. The origins of indigenous microfinance in India predate those reported above in 
Ireland and Germany by around 3000 years, covering three major strands: moneylenders, 
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each with a complex and interlinked history, much of it yet to be systematized, and all still in 
existence today. Moneylenders are the oldest of the three strands, with a variegated and 
checkered history. After early efforts at regulation, they went out of control in rural areas 
during medieval and British India, became part of a feudal system, and destroyed the 
independent peasantry, relegating themselves to the role of the evil moneylender. They have 
remained lenders of last resort, at the opposite end of the central bank.  
 
Rotating savings and credit associations (chit funds, kuris) are ancient; but I have no 
information on how far they date back. It appears that traditionally they were unregulated and 
small. Since 1945 they have increasingly, and since 1982 fully, come under regulation, which 
probably greatly contributed to their strength and outreach. Informal chits continue to exist; 
there is no information on their spread and relevance in urban and rural areas. In rural 
finance surveys they are notably absent. There is also no information on the use of the chit 
technology as an instrument of resource mobilization by banks, as found in Indonesia where 
arisan are ubiquitous but unregulated. 
 
Regulation and self-regulation of merchant banking, embedded into the caste system, have 
evolved over a period of over 2000 years and produced a strong and resilient indigenous 
banking sector, which has been weakened by, but ultimately survived, interventionist colonial 
policies. Western-type banks have been juxtaposed during British rule. In the sphere of big 
business indigenous bankers adopted Western banking by pooling their capital, establishing 
joint-stock companies or buying shares of banks; in the small and medium business sphere 
indigenous-style banking has continued.  
 
Credit cooperatives were introduced before 1900, in an attempt to replicate the German 
Raiffeisen model; a legal framework evolved since 1904. I am not aware that any effort was 
made to build on indigenous institutions. Numerically cooperatives dominate the formal rural 
financial sector, together with cooperative banks as state-owned apex institutions. Yet, in the 
policy environment of a command economy, state dominance and interference in their 
operations have perverted their character as self-help organizations; subsidies, loan 
channelling and a lack of stringent supervision have undermined their viability and the depth 
of their service. Reform is on the agenda. Will the damage done to the movement be 
undone? At least there is a great potential to remedy replication.   
 
Appalled by the level of rural indebtedness and the lack of access to formal credit 
independent India added state banking to the spectrum: nationalizing commercial banks, 
expanding their rural branch network and adding a network of Regional Rural Banks. In 
addition, every state and every district has its own state-owned cooperative bank. This 
greatly contributed to outreach, but at the expense of institutional viability and depth of 
financial services. The state turned out to be a poor banker, running its institutions into 
losses for which they were compensated from the state budget. Reform of the commercial 
banking sector during the 1990s has been successful; reform of the Regional Rural Banks is 
ongoing, reform of the cooperative banks initiated.  
 
India has perhaps the most diversified rural financial infrastructure of any country, comprising 
around 160,000 outlets as part of the formal financial sector. Yet some 250-300 million of the 
rural poor are not served. Reform of the formal rural financial sector is not seen as a solution. 
The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), carved out of RBI in 
1982, has therefore embarked on an innovation: SHG banking. Building on the experience of 
its 700 credit NGOs and MFIs and a pilot project in Indonesia by the central bank of 
Indonesia (BI) under the auspices of APRACA, it has embarked on a massive, but non-
mandatory program of linking banks and self-help groups. Debating the pros and cons of 
Grameen banking vs linkage banking, it decided in favor of the latter: activating the existing 
infrastructure of banks and social organizations; using bank rather than donor resources in 
the provision of credit; and being savings- rather than credit-driven. NABARD provides 
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agencies involved for capacity building. The SHGs comprise groups previously or newly 
established by NGOs or GOs; there is no link to indigenous institutions. The majority of 
groups, with up to 20 members, are not legally registered. In some states there is a strong 
movement in forming federations with a new type of cooperative legal status (MACS). At very 
low transaction costs, and repayment rates near 100%, SHG banking is highly profitable to 
both banks and SHGs, whose internal resources grow rapidly.  
 
RBI has provided a conducive policy framework, Union and state governments have given 
their backing, thus creating the political will for what has become, over a period of ten years, 
the largest and fastest-growing microfinance program in the developing world. As of March 
2005 it has reached 1.6 million savings-based groups credit-linked to 35,000 bank branches 
and primary cooperatives, with 24 million members, covering a population of over 120 
million. Growth continues, and impact is deeply felt by the members; moneylenders have 
largely gone out of business in the areas of operation of SHGs. Major challenges include 
expansion into underserved areas, effective supervisionand the role of SHG federations in 
providing a sustainable institutional framework for informal groups.  
 
Digging into the history of rural and microfinance in Europe, Africa and Asia generates a 
wealth of data and insights But it is far from producing a fully coherent picture of what propels 
or keeps back the growth in outreach and viability of microfinance, rural finance, 
microbanking and their mainstreaming. We are calling for a coordinated effort at 
microfinance history in developed and developing countries:  
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